International Crisis Group has published a report, "Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan". Released on March 26, the report is a thorough analysis of the obstacles of a political settlement towards an end to the conflict in Afghanistan with comprehensive recommendations for all stakeholders including the Afghan Government, political and armed opposition, the US and NATO, others members of the international country and regional powers.

Anyone interested in an insightful analysis with latest updates on the development of talks about talks should read the full report with over 50 pages. It is available on the website of International Crisis Group. Those, who have been following news and analysis in this regard in media, can jump to chapters V, VI and VII which cover problems in the current process of talks with Taliban and concluding recommendations. I am highlighting below some important paragraphs from different chapters in the report.

The Karzai Administration has been pushing forward with a highly flawed and self-centered approach without a proper strategy. The reports says, "Karzai's haphazard efforts to cut deals with factional leaders within the insurgency are endangering the prospects for a near-term settlement. Changed domestic and international sentiment has given Karzai license to use the rhetoric of reconciliation to his political advantage, portraying himself and his politics of patronage as the linchpin of any future power-sharing arrangement.

While compromise has often been the watchword of Karzai's administration, patronage has been the currency of its policy on negotiations with the Taliban and Hizb-e Islami "moderates", a short-sighted policy at best. Moreover, his government's credibility as a negotiating partner has been considerably weakened by widespread corruption and abuse of power."

The report also highlights the ignored segment of Afghanistan—women and minorities—both by the Karzai Administration and international stakeholders. "Nor has the government laid out a plan to protect the rights of those most vulnerable – particularly women and minorities – in a newly reordered state. Indeed, the question of protecting women's rights under a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban has barely been touched on apart from occasional rhetoric. Several prominent women have raised objections to U.S. support for a Taliban office in Qatar, but beyond acknowledging their understandable anxiety, neither Kabul nor Washington has indicated more than a glancing interest in incorporating women in the negotiation process."

Inclusion of all domestic stakeholders is the most important factor for success of any negotiations and reconciliation process for the political settlement in Afghanistan. It is a fact blatantly ignored and underestimated both by the circle around President Karzai pursuing certain political agendas and the international community. The report says, "A truly Afghan-led process would require far more than just the government taking the lead. The president is already not viewed as a credible broker, and his failure to broaden the national dialogue on political settlement is further undermining his standing with the political opposition.

The absence of leading opposition personalities and the presence of few women at government-sponsored forums such as the June 2010 National Consultative Peace Jirga, the November 2011 Traditional Loya Jirga and the December 2011 Bonn Conference underscore the growing distance between the Karzai government and its political opposition. If a settlement is to lead to a sustainable peace, Kabul must incorporate the views and aspirations of the political opposition before any further negotiations with the armed opposition are undertaken."

The report also highlights how the Karzai Administration has been undermining the process through its patronage approach. High Peace Council, which is supposedly the government body authorized with popular support after the Loya Jirga should lead the process.

International Crisis Group reports says the executive board of the Peace Council is dominated by those who are currently and formerly affiliated with the Taliban, Hizb-e Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG), Hizb-e Islami-Khalis (HIK) and Harakat-e Inqelab.

The reports says, the highly personalized approach of Engineer Spinzada, an influential member of Karzai's National Security Council that follows with the Peace Council, during talks about talks endangers the entire process. "It raises serious questions about the durability of Karzai's overall negotiation strategy. With the U.S. continuing to drive the process, the gap between the U.S. rhetoric on "Afghan-led" negotiations and the reality of deal-making with the Taliban that bypasses Afghan stakeholders is likely to widen in the lead up to the end-of-2014 transition."

There are some words of wisdom for Taliban in the report. "The Taliban must recognize there will be strong domestic resistance to substantially altering the basic democratic attributes of the constitutional system, including elected representative institutions and guaranteed rights and freedoms for all. Whatever the last decade's governance failures, Afghans have more than demonstrated their commitment to maintaining this democratic, inclusive structure, including an elected parliament. Pro-democracy elements within the political elite– especially minorities – have shown they are more than capable of putting up a fierce struggle, armed or political, to maintain a pluralistic political order."

The report says reconciliation process must start with domestic debate on broader complex issues that has been the ideological driving force behind insurgency as well as poor governance by the Karzai Administration.
"Stability in Afghanistan will remain elusive until the reconciliation process is recast in much broader terms, addressing the constitutional crises that Afghanistan has faced for the better part of three decades. The power imbalances between the executive, legislature and judiciary must be squarely addressed. But genuine redistribution of power will require the Afghan government and the international community to look beyond power-sharing with the insurgents as a means of stabilizing the country".

It also warns what I have been saying on these pages: "Any attempt to extend President Karzai's term beyond 2014 would trigger an irreversible constitutional crisis and widen the appeal of taking up arms against the government."

The report asks the international community to pressure the Afghan government for electoral and constitutional reforms that would make space for further debate about changes in the constitution needed for a political settlement to be compromised by all domestic stakeholders.

"Aid to the Afghan government for the 2014 presidential and 2015 parliamentary polls should be conditioned on repeal of the February 2010 presidential decree on the electoral law, rationalisation of the electoral calendar and an overhaul of the voter registry to include redrawing of electoral constituencies to make them more responsive to present demographics and political and geographic divisions.

Prioritize discussion of electoral reforms for the international conference in Tokyo in July 2012 and negotiate an agreement from the Afghan government to address problems with the electoral calendar before May 2013.Condition aid for future Afghan elections on the repeal of the February 2010 presidential decree on the electoral law, rationalization of the electoral calendar and an overhaul of the voter registry, to include a redrawing of electoral constituencies to make them more responsive to present-day demographics and geographic divisions."

And at the end, the International Crisis Group report recommends what has been increasingly demanded by major political opposition groups that a comprehensive reconciliation process must be led by the UN.