The idea of talks and negotiations with Taliban was originally an American one. It was the U.S. in the waning months of the George Bush Administration that began to seriously talk of talks and offered the "political resolution" of the conflict as a viable option on the table. The Karzai government in Kabul later caught up with the idea. Prior to that, such institutions as the "peace strengthening commission" headed by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi was in the business of peace making for years although it never had any strategic vision and content and was limited to drawing in quasi-Taliban as repenting fighters.
Today and after almost three years of talks about talks with Taliban, the U.S. has taken over the reins of peace making and very few are being allowed to be privy to what transpires behind closed doors. Today, the government of Afghanistan, as well as many other influential stakeholders in the Afghanistan conundrum, complains of American unwillingness to let others have a share in a process that has not been transparent from the outset.
The U.S., in the initial few months of these hush-hush negotiations with Taliban – or people whom it deemed bona fide representatives of Taliban – tried hard to exclude even Pakistan. However, along the way and as it struggled to push the talks move off the ground, it dawned upon them that without some sort of contribution from Pakistan, it is next to impossible to even reach out to those Taliban who are important enough or well-placed enough in Taliban hierarchy to matter.
This American doggedness to single-handedly push ahead with hush-hush talks with Taliban is rendering impossible the possibility of an intra-Afghan dialogue and reconciliation that is so desperately needed. As of late, the U.S. has been making efforts to encourage reconciliation between Taliban and the so-called Northern Alliance stakeholders as the two principal antagonists of the Afghan theater.
But, on the other hand, this effort is in contradiction with and is being undercut by this unpopular and ill-advised American insistence on keeping talks with Taliban an American-only affair. Even the most prominent of Northern Alliance leaders are voicing their displeasure about this kind of American approach and this cannot and should not be lost on Americans. After all, these northern leaders are one dimension to the Afghan conflict and whether or not peace will prevail is dependent on their side of equation as well.
The contribution and assistance from Pakistan has been difficult to come by for Americans. At times when Pakistan has offered a helping hand, it has been loaded with quid pro quo conditions with the U.S. being forced to return the favor in some way or another. In some cases such as the American efforts to rope in the elusive Haqqani group, the role of Pakistan in helping the U.S. trap or reach out to some influential members of this faction was significant. The U.S. was allowed access and Pakistan's help was significant.
The U.S. still insists on getting ahead with the hush-hush talks with Taliban single-handedly. The patience in Afghanistan is thinning and it is fueling suspicion of Afghanistan's neighbors who are apprehensive of what the U.S. is doing. It is very pertinent on the part of the U.S. to do away with this sense of phobia and start to open up this process and make it more transparent. This will be in the interest of both the U.S. as well as Afghanistan and will make the chances of success stronger.
It is a blunder being committed on the part of the U.S. to get on with talks secretly and without taking into consideration the justified and rightful considerations of Afghan government as well as Afghanistan's neighbors who are indispensable parts of the regional ecosystem. Furthermore, talks on such a basis and without broadening the base of participants will not ultimately succeed. At best, it will produce a short-lived agreement that will be vulnerable to collapsing as soon as the conditions and circumstances change.
At worst, there is a strong likelihood of the nascent talks and negotiations collapsing mid-way. As the U.S. and its Qatari allies are bracing themselves for operationalizing the Doha office for Taliban, the U.S.'s Afghanistan policy-makers would be well-advised to take these peculiarities and realities of Afghanistan into account.
The U.S. should not deal with the issue of talks with Taliban on the basis of a trial and error approach. There is plenty of wisdom and expertise available with many good folks out there who have been in contact with Afghanistan and the region for decades and know Afghanistan far better than, say, a CIA or pentagon official who makes the main decisions.
Another matter is that within the American government, policy-making on Afghanistan and particularly on the issue of talks with Taliban has been dominated by the American military-intelligence community with the CIA and the Pentagon calling the shots. This dominance of security agencies over the overall process of policy-making on Afghanistan is ill-advised and is not producing the desired effects. It is stifling out the voice of knowledgeable people who know Afghanistan well. It is shutting out crucial talent to help in resolving the Afghan dilemma.
This military-intelligence approach is, in fact, directly and indirectly contributing to making the overall American strategies in Afghanistan less effective and less in tune with the Afghan reality. It would have been far better if the State Department or the civilian policy-makers had the charge of crafting the most crucial of decisions in Afghanistan. In any likelihood, it would have produced a more sensible Afghan policy-making and would have prevented the rise of vested military interests who, given their nature, assign greater importance to fulfillment of regional ambitions than stabilization of a conflict-ridden Afghanistan.
Between working towards regional ambitions and stabilizing Afghanistan, the U.S. can make only one choice. Of course, pursuing such regional geo-strategic and geo-political objectives comes at the expense of having a volatile Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, so far this has been the case and there is every reason to believe that this would only continue. This is enough to render peace in this country a mirage and it has been so for a while. This is a bitter reality and there can be no denying it.