The conflict in Afghanistan, now in its fourth decade, is one of the most complex and longest in the world's contemporary history. In comparison with other such conflicts, the one in Afghanistan stands out as a peculiar one in which the line between internal civil strife and external aggression is blurred. The mosaic of stakeholders in this conflict is a mix of heterogeneous and diverse players each having its own political, social, cultural and economic peculiarities.

Among these diverse sets of actors and players, the case of Taliban is, perhaps, the most complicated. To this day, there remains incomplete understanding and insight into the true world of this movement on the part of Afghan people in general and even observers and foreign and Afghan political decision-makers.

What distinguishes the Taliban movement from the rest of the stakeholders in Afghanistan conflict is the enigmatic veil of secrecy that conceals the true internal and external working dynamics of the Taliban movement. For even the most insightful of observers and experts, understanding the entire range of issues and factors that go into the making of this movement has proved next to impossible.

Both Afghan and foreign observers each have their opinions of who the Taliban are and how they work. Opinions and views are piecemeal and, more often than not, mixed with clichéd notions of who and what the Taliban movement is. This peculiar complexity and enigmatic nature of the Taliban have been one reason that can in part explain why the government of Afghanistan and the international community including the U.S. seem confused and their efforts to deal with Taliban has been guided by desperate fire-fighting rather than any strategic initiative.

The U.S., despite public pretensions to the contrary, is bewildered by the extent and the ferocity of the insurgency put up by the Taliban. This can be discerned from the many off-the-record and unofficial remarks of many current and former American military officials in Afghanistan whose remarks and views on the state of the war are routinely reported in alternative media outlets on the internet and elsewhere.

There have been gains made in the war against the Taliban on the battlefields of the South and East over the past two years in part due to such tactics as the elimination of high-ranking and mid-level Taliban commanders. This has resulted into a measure of calm and stability returning to such volatile areas and provinces as Helmand and Kandahar where, until a few years ago, Taliban controlled many districts with foreign troops confined to military bases.

But as discussed, the U.S. military officials here in Afghanistan still believe that these gains are "reversible" and cannot be sustained without mounting sacrifices of foreign troops with the Afghan security forces still to find the capacity to fully replace them.

But as the ancient Chinese thinker and war strategist, Sun Tzu, has said, in any war, a correct and thorough understanding of the enemy constitutes the first step towards victory. No victory would prove and has proved within grasp without the victor knowing its enemy well.

In the case of Afghanistan conflict, neither the Afghanistan government nor its international partners have acquired a deep and thorough understanding of the Taliban movement. Even if there are people and personal perceptions and opinions that are close to the reality, the official policies and strategies adopted by these governments do not reflect these views and do not take them into account.

Many such more sane voices are marginalized in the process of formulating and executing of official policies and strategies. The American strategy of talking to the Taliban and drawing them further into this process through creating a political office for them in Qatar is predicated on the idea that the Taliban – or the core of this movement – is reconcilable and, eventually, can be persuaded to lay down arms, acquiesce to long-term/permanent American military presence and share political power within the current political and Constitutional framework.

However, a basic understanding of who the Taliban are and what constitutes this movement's raison deter make it clear that this movement will never submit to democratic and peaceful coexistence with other social groups within the current framework, much less allowing long-term American military presence inside Afghanistan. Any sort of deal with the Taliban will prove to be short-lived and, in the current context of Afghanistan, the failure of negotiations with Taliban can easily degenerate the country to a civil war-like situation. 

There are plenty of serving and former American political and military officials who have come to know the Taliban well and are well aware of these realities. But there is a long way until these personal views and opinions can be translated into actual policies and strategies pursued by the American government and its military decision-makers.

The U.S., no doubt, will find it out the hard way who and what the Taliban are. It will also come to know the fact that there is a great deal of difference between the Iraqi resistance fighters and the Taliban in Afghanistan. While the U.S. succeeded in eventually pacifying the situation in Iraq and bringing under control the armed resistance in that country, it does not imply that the U.S. would be able to achieve the same through the ongoing negotiations here in Afghanistan.

The roots of the phenomenon called the Taliban and the roots of the conflict in Afghanistan run much deeper and are much more complex that could be resolved through a few years of hush-hush negotiations with the Taliban.

At this juncture, what is the crucial necessity is that the American political and military decision-makers and other influential members of the international community as well as the government of Afghanistan set out to inform and guide their policies and strategies in the light of a correct, realistic and thorough understanding of the Taliban movement and the broader set of factors and issues that have gone into the making of the conflict here in Afghanistan. Time is running out and the danger is that if the ongoing process of negotiations with Taliban led by the U.S. fails or falters, then there might never be a second chance.