Afghanistan, no doubt, is an extremely complex environment and this complexity has been one factor that has rendered only partially successful the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan over the past one decade. Many of the stakeholders in Afghanistan project such as the ISAF, the international aid agencies such as the U.N. and other international organizations and the donor community do not still have a correct and thorough understanding of Afghanistan and this fact reflects in their many flawed strategies, assumptions and policies over the past one decade.

For example, the strategy that most of the aid and developmental assistance should be channelized towards the volatile provinces in the south and east so that the Taliban insurgency can be weakened was clearly a failure. Some vested interests in the government of Afghanistan further encouraged the international community to push ahead with this wrong assumption.

In the end and after ten years, the strategy did not have any tangible impact on reversing the tide of the Taliban insurgency but, instead, was very helpful in creating divisions and disparities across regions and provinces and disillusioning a significant segment of the Afghan population who perceived the strategy as being driven by discrimination and ethnic considerations.

The list of such follies, mistakes and wrong assumptions over the past one decade is long. If in some sectors, strategy and policy-making has been flawed, some other sectors such as governance and particularly local governance have been largely neglected by the international community and the international aid agencies.

The much-crucial sector of local governance has been largely left to the government of Afghanistan to take care of while the sector has not received any significant funding and direct intervention by the international community in terms of creating the precondition required for breaking through the wall of opposing forces that are against true empowerment of local communities and administrations.

What has further exacerbated the problems is the highly centralized nature of decision-making process that has left local administrations at the province and district levels fatally dependent on the center without any significant authority and initiative on their own. At the local level (provincial and district), the processes of planning, budgeting and allocation of funds is largely dysfunctional.

The whole process is characterized by developmental planning being absent or not in line with needs of the local area and population. As a result of the plans, policies and programs being decreed from the center (Kabul), local administrators such as provincial governors and district governors are largely helpless in responding adequately and efficiently to the real needs of their local populations.

Ground realities in a local area might demand a certain course of policy-making and action but the bureaucracy in Kabul, being aloof and unaware of local needs, continues with its own one-size-fits-all policies and programs. These grave shortcomings highlight the importance of de-centralization and greater devolution of power away from a centralized bureaucracy and constitute a bona fide case for this imperative.

The government of Afghanistan's efforts in recent years to improve local administrations (such as creation of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance) has had the accompanying effect of further reinforcing this centralized distribution of power and authority instead of increasing participation of local communities and populations in their local governance.

The fact that this fiscal year the government of Afghanistan, as in previous years, could spend only a meager 40% of its development funds across sectors and ministries is itself a strong proof of the failure of this centralized system.

The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was established in 2007 to provide overall direction and control to local administrations at the provincial and district levels, develop policies for them and act as an coordinating institution among the various ministries in Kabul whose directorates and presidencies are present at the province and district levels.

The IDLG and its functions have been helpful in terms of improving and speeding up of communication between local administrations and the center. It has also provided the much-needed training and capacity-building to local administrators and bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels.

But a major problem with the IDLG has been that it has reinforced this centralization as mentioned earlier. This is reflected in the fact that the IDLG directly reports to the president in Kabul. The current government's efforts to improve local governance in Afghanistan continue to be within the present set-up and structure and all the ways are being explored except the real option of actually devolving power and authority to elected – and not appointed – local administrators.

The reason is a combination of many factors. The paranoia and suspicion of the government in Kabul towards a de-centralized power structure (itself a product of a long tradition of centralized rule in Afghanistan) and the presence of powerful vested interests who resist change are some of the factors.

Local governance in Afghanistan of today continues to be a realm of non-governmental sector and actors such as the NGOs, the U.N. agencies and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams with the government of Afghanistan nowhere to be seen. Except for the education sector, across all sectors such as health, reconstruction and infrastructure projects, the presence of NGOs are impressive while local governments are largely absent.
District governors have merely symbolic roles with no actual influence or power partly because they do not have any financial and budgetary means to try to exercise influence in their local environments. The operations and projects of non-governmental actors such as the NGOs and even the National Solidarity Program (NSP) bypass and circumvent local governments. For example, district governments have no actual part to play in the NSP program at the local level. The district governor's role is merely advisory or in many instances, important local government functionaries such the local governor also takes part in the corruption and rent-seeking practices, which is widespread.

Currently, local administrations and local governance are a competing ground for a multitude of actors and the result has been chaos and confusion. The list of all the actors that are involved in local governance are long. The international and national NGOs, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the provincial governor and his network of informal agents across the province, the district governor, the Maliks and Arbabs at the village level, the Community Development Councils formed under NSP/MRRD, provincial councils, district assemblies, etc.

As this long list clearly indicates, the local governance environment continues to be a scene of chaos and confusion with various actors vying for varying degrees of control and influence and tensions prevalent as a result of inter-agency rivalries. The need is to develop a coherent and a common vision for local government and local governance in Afghanistan of today, one that will transcend the existing highly centralized structures and takes effective and meaningful actions towards true empowerment and representation at the local level.