Recently, the Taliban announced that talks and negotiations with the U.S.-led international community do not mean that they would drop weapons and embrace peace. This statement might have surprised many in the West including some in the Obama Administration, who have pinned all their hopes on finding "a negotiated, political solution" to this war. This statement, however, was hardly surprising for those in Afghanistan who know the nature of the Taliban and know very well that trying to appease the Taliban and kneeling down before them with olive branches in hand and without revamping the current flawed model of negotiations, only would add further to their hostility and would make them firmer in the path of war and violence.
The fact is that there has been a great deal of exaggeration in the extent of success of the recent talks with Taliban. The idea of a political office for the Taliban in the Qatari capital of Doha, although having been agreed to by some unknown sections within the Taliban, is very unlikely to have any real and tangible impact on the peace process and on the fate of the war in Afghanistan.
Sitting of a few Taliban "representatives" in Doha does not guarantee that the Taliban leadership of the Taliban will be willing to drop resistance and embrace true reconciliation at a time when the Taliban are gradually gaining self-confidence and politically bolder.
The fact, as admitted by a section of Taliban themselves, is that this movement will never compromise on some of its strategic objectives including an eventual overthrowing of the current government in Kabul and forcing the withdrawal of all the foreign troops currently stationed in Afghanistan.
These are the strategic objectives that provide the raison d'être of the Taliban movement and render futile any attempt to force a compromise on the leadership and rank and file of the Taliban leadership without actually weakening them both politically and militarily.
Given these realities and given the facts that the majority of foreign troops will be out by the end of 2014 and that the government of Afghanistan is both unwilling and unable to deal effectively and strongly with the Taliban, the only perspective that is visible ahead of Afghanistan is that the current vicious cycle of war and violence will only continue with neither the government of Afghanistan and the international coalition nor the Taliban able to break out of this vicious cycle.
As I have maintained before, five years from now, we would still be fighting a fierce insurgency in the villages and districts of Afghanistan and have a government and international community that still insist on negotiations. Having pointed out these realities, it is important to bear in mind that the process of talks and negotiations with the Taliban can have a chance of success if it is accompanied with a full-fledged, multi-pronged strategy to undermine and weaken the Taliban movement both militarily and politically.
When many provincial governors, many ministers in Kabul and many others in the Afghan National Army and National Police continue to provide direct and indirect support and help to their Taliban "brothers", you cannot expect the Taliban to become weakened but only to strengthen and spread their tentacles.
The process of talks and negotiations with Taliban should be accompanied with active and ongoing efforts to weaken the Taliban militarily. In this regard, David Petraeus' position that talking should be parallel to fighting is the right track to follow.
The core of the Taliban and those who are tied to the outside sponsors of this war should be degraded and undermined. The process of talks and negotiations, in its current shape, format and content, not only disregards these vital prerequisites, but further provides legitimacy to the Taliban and strengthens their resolve to continue in the path of war and violence.
Once again it is important to emphasize that dealing with the Taliban should be based on a comprehensive strategy that takes into view and incorporates the entire spectrum of factors, both internal and external, that go into the sustaining of this movement.
While degrading and weakening the Taliban militarily is a an absolute necessity, efforts must be redoubled to track and close down the sources of funding for the Taliban as well as increase pressure on the providers of logistics and assistance to this movement. In this regard, Pakistan must be brought to the fold and it involves that country revisiting, reframing its regional policies and ambitions.
The fact remains that core of the Taliban, which so clearly would never accept genuine reconciliation, should be annihilated both militarily and politically. The key to this as well as to the larger goal of stabilization of Afghanistan, preservation of past achievements and prevention of yet another chapter of turmoil lies in reaching a genuine regional and international consensus by way of much greater regional consultation and collaboration.
Regional initiatives aimed at greater regional consultation and cooperation on the issue of Afghanistan and terrorism are welcome steps towards bringing about better regional understanding and confidence. Stabilization of Afghanistan and resolution of the conflict, however, requires a major diplomatic push to bring together all the regional countries and international stakeholders in Afghanistan.
The leadership of the U.S. in the process would be, nonetheless, essential since the U.S. possesses the diplomatic and political capital needed to bring together all the stakeholders, both regional and trans-regional and prevent the current peace efforts end up entirely futile.
The role and contribution of The U.S., Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, and China and of course other NATO member states are all absolutely essential to bringing lasting and durable stability to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these countries have so far been locked in a state of perpetual enmity towards one another and have failed to render the kind of historic responsibility that they have towards Afghanistan and its success.
As discussed in this article, Taliban as a fanatical ethno-religious entity are not ready to compromise and over the long-term will not stop short of re-establishing their rule as they did in 1990s. The Western coalition led by the U.S. should keep such realities of Afghanistan into perspective if they are truly interested in preventing Afghanistan from descending into yet another era of chaos and conflict.