With the growing insurgency that costs in valuable live, innocent people of Afghanistan on daily basis, get simply astonished what the reconciliation process with Taliban really mean? It seems like the process benefits the Taliban, not the peace in Afghanistan. No doubt, every war will have to end in reconciliation and dialogues but the case of Afghan war differs. For every legitimate dialogue process between two or more parties, there is need for all the parties to signal willingness to talk.

But the reconciliation and talks process, for which the government of Karzai has been working for the last two years or so, looks more like a tale of futility than a real process of peace. The reason is quite clear: The Taliban, in words and actions, have shown no sign of interest in the invitation of Mr. Karzai to join the dialogue process. Nonetheless, they have had some meetings – secret in nature - with United States in the last ten months. The US-Taliban negotiations, according to US officials,are entering a turning point.

President Karzai's changing view on the process peace reconciliation with Taliban has made it difficult for Afghans to know: What is really going on? Until, Burhan ud din Rabbani, the head of High Peace Council was assassinated, Mr. Karzai was blowing the trumpet of calling Taliban as his annoyed brothers.

But after his brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai and Rabbani were assassinated, he admitted to the fact that Taliban are not his annoyed brother but brutal killers and terrorists. Then there was a twist in the peace reconciliation process.

Mr. Karzai said he would no more talk to Taliban but instead with Pakistan. Also he thinks that Pakistan is not sincerely cooperating in making the peace process successful despite of hosting a number of important Taliban leaders. But Hamid Karzai even did not remain stick to the point of talking with Pakistan rather than Taliban. Soon we heard him saying that his government is focusing to resume efforts that may lead to negotiations with Taliban despite Rabbani's killing.

The biggest ambiguity about the peace and reconciliation process is the lack of a clear policy. There is no policy, on hand, that can illustrate on what bases the government of Afghanistan will reconcile with Taliban.

Is reconciliation with Taliban possible without compromising on the fundamental gains Afghanistan has had in the last ten years in human and women rights, civil society, democracy, education and other in other political, economic and social areas? Any deal with Taliban that can put the ten-year gains at stake, would not be acceptable to Afghans. If a compromise is necessary, that should be made by Taliban, not the Afghan government. They have to stop violence, cut links with al Qaida and obey the Constitution of Afghanistan.

The High Peace Council (HPC), formed to facilitate talks with insurgents, has had no significant achievements so far. Reconciliation strategy is uncertain about up to an extent that the 168 HPC members, themselves, do not know what they are supposed to do.

Above all, HPC comprises a significant number of individuals who have fought the Taliban during 1996-2001. This counts as the weakest point or major pitfall for the HPC. The assassination of its head, Burhan ud din Rabbani further proved this council as inefficacious.

Recently, reports based on established of an informal office for Taliban have been circulating in Afghan and international media. The Taliban are said to have indicated willingness to this. If an office will be opened for Taliban, it will definitely help Afghan administration to negotiate with a party that, at least, has a clear address.

But, Taliban's willingness to establishment of office should not be counted as an achievement for Karzai government as that has come as a result of US-Taliban secret meetings. In these meetings, the Karzai administration has had no role to play and therefore, is concerned.

According to reports, the US has held several sessions of talks in the last ten months mostly in Germany and Doha with representatives of Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban's Quetta Shura. Most probably, the Karzai administration has been kept in dark and the US has had no consultation with President Hamid Karzai on the issues discussed with Taliban in these meetings.

This is signaled by the concern expressed by Karzai office recently. After reports on Taliban office, a spokesperson to Karzai's office said, "We oppose any kind of negotiations where delegation or delegations of Afghanistan have no leading role and emphasize that any kind of negotiations must be led by Afghans."

On the other hand, Pakistan which has a key role to play in the peace and reconciliation process of Afghanistan is having a troubled relation with the US due to killing of its 26 soldiers by a NATO airstrike near Afghan border last month. This sour relation is directly affecting the situation in Afghanistan. It does much to further widen the trust gap between Afghanistan and Pakistan which is necessary for Pakistan to bring Taliban leaders to table of negotiations.

Lack of a transparent strategy and presence of critical ambiguities is leading the peace and reconciliation process of Afghan government towards failure. If the international community and the Afghan government are interested to end the Afghan conflict through negotiations with Taliban, they have to present a clear picture of what is happening and what is going to happen to the people of Afghanistan.