Since the days of its first nuclear explosion in May 1974, India gave a strong foothold to the US against China in the region. It was the result of India’s recognition as a responsible nuclear power but US took keen interest in removing the other impediments in the way of nuclear deal. As a follow up action, India and the US made changes in its internal laws to accommodate the new deal. Apart from passing the Agreement from Legislatures of the respective country, the US enacted the Hyde Act and India established an understanding with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the issue of nuclear plant supervision and nuclear safeguards. The understanding between India and the US was furthered when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waived restrictions on India’s nuclear import. It opened India’s option to buy enriched uranium, nuclear technology and other materials from different countries of the world in order to generate electricity and industrial development.
Beginning of Indo-US Nuclear Understanding
Even before the advent of India as an independent, sovereign country in the comity of nations, the world’s balance of power went in favour of nuclear capability. For long in the post-war period the power politics appeared developing a bipolar pattern–the concentration of most of the world’s power, military, industrial and otherwise in the two super powers and these two powers–USA and USSR in contrast with the multi-power world of the past, seemed to have emerged as the major determinants of international politics. Of the two, the USA was first to become a decidedly nuclear power in mid-1940s and the release of nuclear energy has revolutionalised the concepts of national defence and strategy along with the art of planning the realisation of military goals. It has always been a consistent policy of the United States to protect its national interests with all possible means, however, immoral they may be and never allow a prospective and upcoming contender to proceed ahead so that it may challenge the might of the US. This is called “real politicking” and was very much eulogised and theorised by American scholars and policy-makers like Morgenthau, Kelsen and Henry Kissinger during past decades after the Second World War. In the context, the question of the importance that South Asia acquires in the US interests and scheme of priorities remained a persisting debate and there is a difference of opinions. One school of thought accords a very low priority to South Asia since it is geographically distant and economically uninspiring from the US point of view. The other school regards the US involvement in South Asia is being strategically vital and therefore, deep and pervasive. However, over the years, the second opinion gained weightage and it was felt that as long as the United States had an adversary relationship with both China and the Soviet Union, the US would remain concerned with minimising their role in South Asia. Accordingly, the US involvement in South Asia fluctuated, depending upon its intensity and style of competition with other great powers at the global level.
Policy dilemma with a super power
India, with its independence in August 1947, shared a lot of common ideals and institutions such as democracy, freedom of press, freedom of religion, respect for individual liberty, human rights, independance of judiciary, federalism etc. But the foreign policy of a country, far from being an independent variable, depends on number of factors, which especially include domestic concerns and institutions of that country. It is the domestic context in which a country’s foreign policy arises. The domestic context pertains to those important aspects such as the geo-strategic location, historical, socio-cultural and politico- economic environment of the country which prescribes the parameters within which the foreign policy-makers of a country have to shape its foreign policy. This significance of the international milieu in the shaping of Indo-US relations notwithstanding, policy convergences or divergences between two democracies have often been explained mainly in the context o f e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . I n t h e p e r i o d o f C o l d W a r rapprochement, and difference between two countries took fair amount of time due to both internal and external compulsions. From the start, the United States is a super power whereas India is a middle power. And further, a superpower’s domestic compulsions may not be directly related to its relation to any one regional power while a regional power’s approach to international politics is invariably linked to the role of the global power in its internal and neighbourhood politics. In the circumstances, it is quite natural that the US perceives its national interest in global context while India’s immediate concern often hinges around preserving its internal autonomy. A super power could accommodate another super power, because the alternative would be equally devastating to both. But the relationship between a super power and a middle power is of different kinds. The former may not accommodate the latter while the latter cannot allow itself to be a satellite of the former.
US understanding of South Asia
On the issue of Indo-US relations there are some who believe that bilateral relations ‘should be separated from the strategic and multilateral issues and such analysts argue that on some issues which do not directly affect their bilateral relations, the countries may afford to have disagreements, However, in practice, this is not feasible. First, because there is interaction and mutual influence between bilateral and multilateral issues. Second, there are some middle range issues which belong to both worlds. One such issue is the nuclear relationship between the United States and India. It directly affects the vital interests of India, if not those of United States. It is a part of the international debate on nuclear non-proliferation in which both the US and India are active participants, championing opposite points of view. On India’s part, its commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is firm, although, at times, it has been subjected to some strain. During the stewardship of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s commitment in this respect was unequivocal. No doubts were cast on his bona fides, during his lifetime. Only a Nehru could assure the world on behalf of any future government of India that this country would not go in for nuclear weapons.
In just opposite is the US nuclear understanding which revolves round the policy of nuclear deterrence and non- proliferation. It is of the opinion that the US should possess a large number of powerful weapons which would be an effective deterrent against a first nuclear strike by any other nuclear power, especially the Soviet Union. As a result, Washington’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been half-heated and partial. If favours only horizontal non-proliferation, without offering any commitment even to a gradual vertical non- proliferation. The nuclear policy of the US thus sharply clashes w it h t ha t o f I nd ia , w ho s e co mmitm e nt t o n u cl e a r n o n - proliferation is total and which advocates vertical as well as horizontal non-proliferation. India feels that a non-proliferation agreement ignores the present proliferation and pre-occupies itself with the future proliferation which is naturally unrealistic, ineffective and therefore unacceptable and pervasive.