Following the 1998 tests the question of nuclear proliferation had reopened. The test were unambiguously military including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermo- nuclear device. Their declared purpose was “to help the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems. Until May 1998, the region was satisfied with “existential deterrence”, which kept both countries, nuclear capability in ambiguity and in a non-weaponised state. The 1998 demonstration of capability by Pakistan was carried out in something of a crisis situation. There was intense international pressure on Pakistan, including threatened punishments (sticks) and possible inducements (carrots), if it refrained from testing. Pakistan chose to suffer the sticks because it considered that a lack of response would erode the credibility of deterrence, which required not just demonstration of the “capability” but also demonstration of the “will” to respond. Since 1998, the nuclear bomb has been a symbol of India’s power and prestige, but the nuclear domain has always stood as a site within which India’s unique moral judgement could be applied and exihibited. Dominant thinking in international relations finds it hard to reconcile the two trends, and many have scratched their heads in puzzlement over the incongruity of India’s peaceful intentions and hard power hype, or the juxtaposition of “the land of Gandhi” and the bomb.
Effects of explosion
By explosions, in one stroke, the dam broke sweeping away the premise of virtually all of the Western, European, and Japanese-sponsored dialogues. This premise was that South Asians could be dissuaded, via dialogue, from exercising the nuclear option, or if they did possess nuclear weapons, from testing and declaring that they were nuclear weapons states. This not only broke the existing test ban moratorium, for all practical purposes it buried the CTBT. However, in practice, if not in theory the international community has accepted India’s nuclear ambivalence. Following the tests , although both countries were placed under international sanctions, but tests led to a profound revaluation of India in the US. The Talbott-Jaswant talks, as they became known, provided the diplomatic groundwork for an American review of India that ended with President Bill Clinton making a triumphant visit to India. Further the Bush Administration took the Clinton cue and elevated India to an even closer partnership. The credibility of Indian claims to nuclear restraint and responsibility contributed without doubt to the exceptional civil nuclear trading rights India received, outside the bounds of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through the India-US civil nuclear agreement. Perhaps Washington has accepted India’s threat perception from China, who is also on US radar. Analysts in New Delhi have long pointed to Chinese military modernisation as a clear-threat to India. This modernisation includes missile deployment, such as the current deployment of the DF-21 and DF-3 missiles in Qinghai and Yunnan provinces. Furthermore, there is some suspicion among Indian analysts that though Beijing’s stated policy is that of minimum deterrence, the stationing of missiles such as DF-3 and DF-21 reflects a posture of nuclear coercion, and under some conditions, does not preclude a firs t strike against its neighbours. It is also possible that since 1998, Beijing may have deployed nuclear weapons on the Tibetan plateau in response to a perceived Indian conventional military advantage and the nuclear tests. Even during Kargil, the world had saw that Pakistan acted with impunity providing the highest provocation to a self-respecting nation and yet India did not cross the line of control which Pakistan had isolated to cut off the supply routes to its forces. In contrast to Pakistan, India had shown itself to be a responsible nuclear weapon state.
Types of proliferation
Of the two proliferations–vertical and horizontal, the latter is said to be on the strategic agenda of Pakistan. While the first is related to modernisation of nuclear arsenals by the nuclear power states, the second meant spread of nuclear-related base materials, technology and technological knowledge to aspiring nuclear weapon states and to non-state actors such as terrorist groups. If the nuclear arsenals of countries increase in size and in average weapon yield in the future, then multiple attacks on cities would become more likely in future war scenarios. This would further increase the risk of firestorms in cities suffering nuclear attack, which would increase the probability of toxic and radioactive debris reaching adjacent countries. It would also pose greater risk of regional climate disturbances arising from nuclear war. The use of weapons of mass destruction is the very worst way for nations to solve international disputes. Moreover, most forms of nuclear weapons use are likely to be illegal under international law and damage to non-combatant countries in war breaches international law.
South Asian dangers ahead
In the context, the history of the A.Q. Khan network and its assistance to states such as North Korea and Iran deserves special mention. And what is more, Pakistan’s ambitious nuclear agenda is now drawing a not-so-unwilling Sri Lanka into the brewing nuclear whirlwind in south Asia. Evidently, ‘Pakistan is all set to begin consultations with Sri Lanka to help set up a nuclear power plant in Trincomallee’s Sampur. A hurt and frustrated Sri Lanka, so rendered by the outcome of the recently concluded United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) session, in all probability is very enthusiastic about the proposed venture, not so much because of the economic benefits it will bring about as it is because of the opportunity this new partnership presents to avenge the isolation, she suffered at the hands of India at said session. Added to this impending disaster is the more immediate issue of deviating state capital away from poverty alleviation. Ejaz Ghani, in his article ‘The Poor half-billion: What is holding back lagging regions in South Asia?”, aptly calls the region a “depressing paradox” where luxury and absolute poverty co-exist, mocking the astounding growth South Asia has achieved in the last few decades. Ghani presents an account of the two dimensions of Asia in existence, labelling one “Asia shinning” and the other “Asia suffering”. The latter, he explains, “is doing no better than many Sub-Saharan African countries.” It is therefore, imperative for all South Asian states to appreciate that compromising regional solidarity will amount to compromising the interests of individual states.