KABUL - Representatives of Afghan and regional countries’ policy groups on Sunday signed a joint declaration calling for peace and stability in Afghanistan, officials said.

Issued at end of the gathering, arranged by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the declaration was signed among Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

In the statement, the policy groups said nearly 60 experts and analysts from regional states agreed that without a peaceful Afghanistan, future stability in the region would remain under threat.

They believed peace in Afghanistan was important for economic growth in regional countries. Facilitator Haroon Amin said the project was planned in 2012 to address concerns about post-2014 Afghanistan.

A year back, he said, people feared a radical change in Afghanistan in 2014, when foreign combat troops would leave. Therefore, he argued, the Foundation had been making efforts to promote regional cooperation.

Director of Friedrich Ebert Adrian Walter Drove said the core objective behind the long-term project was to bring durable peace, stability and prosperity to Afghanistan and regional countries.

She said signing of the declaration -- in which experts offered their views on the future of the region -- was a good first step toward concrete regional cooperation.

She said the Foundation was trying to facilitate regional agreement among politicians, parliamentarians, diplomats, high military officials, analysts and media representatives.

The project supports the concept of Istanbul process and Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECCA) and wants to issue a declaration involving 10 regional countries.

Sarah Hees, Regional Coordinator Peace and Security Policy for Friedrich Ebert in India, said the initiative was taken in 2012 to build trust among regional states.

In the declaration, the participants agreed on:

1. (i). Reaffirming their respect to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, and (ii) further reaffirming their sustained support for Afghanistan and its people to build a stable, secure, democratic, and economically viable state, free of extremism, terrorism and narcotics
2. (i) Acknowledging the geostrategic location of Afghanistan, situated at the centre of diverse regions of Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, the Far East and Eurasia and the need for its integration into the global order; (ii). recognising the difficulty associated with the geo-strategic location – at times an asset and at others a liability – as well as the internal political, security and economic constraints of Afghanistan, coupled with the self-centric, ambitious, overlapping and – at times – competing foreign interests as key factors be-hind continued interventions and invasions, (iii). stressing the need for the emergence of a regionally interconnect-ed thinking at an umbrella level, covering these regions with Afghanistan as the direct link to all, and (iv). looking forward to the evolution and adoption of a concerted effort to address the security, economic and political challenges faced by Afghanistan, and to improve the outcomes through result-based cooperation by its neighbors, and near-neighboring and regional countries,
3. (i). Noting that Afghanistan today, as compared to the last few decades, has made some relatively remark-able – yet tenuous – gains with vast segments of its population residing in urban settings, including a more aware youth population willing to engage as contributing members of their region and the world, (ii) acknowledging the success of Afghanistan and its people in creating a competitive political environment by forming a multiparty system, laying down the fundamentals for a renewed civil society and enabling free media and free speech, and in this regard, (iii) expressing gratitude for the efforts of the international community towards accomplishing these gains, and (iv) welcoming additional efforts by countries that are increasing their civilian aid, including humanitarian support during the Decade of Transformation,
4. (i) Acknowledging the assistance provided by the regional countries in the reconstruction and development projects of Afghanistan, in particular that of India, Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, China, Kuwait and Pakistan, (ii) acknowledging further the goodwill and assistance for the development of Afghanistan by the Russia and the CARs, and (iii) welcoming a more robust role of the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries during the Decade of Transformation,
5. (i) Realizing that the regional threats impacting the regions of Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, the Far East and Eurasia are directly linked to regional instability and paradoxically that regional stability is intertwined with regional prosperity and growth, and that Afghanistan is the linchpin that can alter the outcome in either case, (ii) agreeing that terrorism, violent extremism and militancy are common threats to these regions, and (iii) reaffirming commitment that fighting terrorism, extremism and militancy in all their forms and manifestations, including the use of radicalized non-state actors and militia forces as proxies, among them unregistered private security companies, is an essential regional objective that, in particular at the present, requires a serious programme for urgent dismantling of hard and soft infrastructure, such as the safe havens which feeds and sustains them,
6. (i) Recognizing the need for effective and result-oriented regional, interregional and international cooperation for demand reduction as well as to counter the production, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, in particular the on-going strong links between terrorist activities and illicit drugs, and (ii). emphasizing, while acknowledging past achievements by the neighboring states such as Iran as well as the ef-forts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) against trafficking of illicit drugs, the need to undertake a joint regional counter-narcotics effort, including creating an anti-narcotics safety-belt around Afghanistan, law-enforcement and interdiction, and to assist Afghanistan with the elimination of production and trafficking of narcotics, and (iii) creating alternative crop substitution and livelihoods programs, as well as creating jobs in the industries and service sectors, in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility,
7. (i) Emphasizing the importance of promoting and strengthening cooperation to combat the threats to peace and stability, and the need for a comprehensive approach to address the interconnected nature of the security, economic and development challenges in Afghanistan, while (ii) stressing that the conviction in military solution alone will not solve the greater militancy problem in and around Afghanistan,
8. (i) Acknowledging that Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have suffered from lack of trust since 1947, (ii) underlining the absolute necessity for addressing the root causes rather than the by-products of the trust deficit, (iii) acknowledging further that the current circum-stances offer ripe opportunities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as the primary stakeholders in seeking these opportunities, and (iv) recommending to remove apprehensions at all levels to achieve lasting amity between the two countries through official and other channels in the interest of regional stability,
9. (i) Calling for Afghanistan-related confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan as each harbours suspicions about the other’s interests and activities in Afghanistan, and (ii) urging them to reduce and overcome these apprehensions at all levels, including through official channels, in the interest and benefit of regional stability and prosperity,
10. Expressing the need for an early resolution of the Iran-US standoff, which would create a conducive atmosphere to better coordinate and implement development projects in Afghanistan,
11. Supporting greater India-Iran cooperation and common interests in Afghanistan, including coordination on the implementation of development projects and transit of goods to and from Afghanistan, the early contours of which are beginning to emerge,
12. (i) Encouraging measures to reduce skepticism of the CARs towards Afghanistan and to form equal partnership between the CARs and Afghanistan (ii) supporting steps to overcome the exclusive notion of Afghanistan as a source of threat among the Central Asian elites, analysts and academic communities, and societies, and (iii) recommending deepening joint efforts by the CARs and Afghanistan not only to combat cross-border threats and challenges, but also to develop infrastructure projects for trade and communications, and to strengthen cultural and humanitarian cooperation,
13. (i). Stressing the need for the execution of a responsible drawdown, including the retention of a time-bound residual of the NATO-led ISAF forces to prevent the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan which could impact the greater region, and to advise, assist and train the ANSF as well as to realize the commitments made in the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago (Chicago Summit) to financially sustain the ANSF beyond 2014, (ii). calling upon the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries to individually or jointly adopt measures that help the enhancement of security conditions in Afghanistan and its neighborhood by assisting the process of improving security situation by fully cooperating and supporting the efforts of the Afghan Government, including the ANSF, in removing the threats to the security of Afghanistan, and (iii) emphasizing the need to avoid interferences in Afghanistan in support of certain proxies either directly or via non-state actors,
14. (i) Welcoming all regional cooperation initiatives, starting with the 2002 Kabul Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations, and the importance of region-al cooperation endorsed by various international conferences on Afghanistan (ii) welcoming further the increased regional cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors as well as among the countries of the region as an effective means to promote security and development, (iii) recognizing the important role of existing regional organisations and programs, in particular the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), and the need to expand the scope of their efforts for further cooperation and integration in the region toward greater synergies, (iv).acknowledging ECO’s specific efforts towards the reconstruction and development needs of Afghanistan through the establishment of »ECO Special Fund for Reconstruction of Afghanistan« and other initiatives, and (v) realizing that although regionalism has gained momentum between some regions linked through Afghanistan, a holistic Afghanistan-centric thinking at an inter-regional umbrella level approach encompassing Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, East Asia and Eurasia, requires further effort by all stakeholders to understand the difficulty associated with the challenges in order to offer solutions and sustained international support,
15. (i). Welcoming the endorsement of both the Istanbul Process and the RECCA to promote regional security and cooperation through enhanced regional dialogue, CBMs and economic cooperation set out in the process to include: counter-narcotics; counter-terrorism; trade, commerce and investment opportunities; region-al infrastructure; education; and disaster management, (ii). agreeing on the transformation of Afghanistan into a business hub and trade and transit corridor, linking the regions, including through the commissioning of natural gas and oil pipelines and transmission lines, and (iii). stressing the need to: enhance existing local and regional networks of rail and road transportation connectivity; improving the international civil aviation capabilities, including through increased foreign investment; develop infrastructure; pursue exploration and exploitation of natural resources and energy supply; integrate border management through bilateral and regional transit trade agreements; expand consular visa cooperation to facilitate business travel, in order to promote sustainable and integrated economic growth, including agricultural, humanitarian and social projects and indigenous industries,
16. Encouraging enhanced inter-regional and people-to-people contacts and exchanges in all sectors of society, particularly between members of the parliaments, security officials, civil society, youth and women organisations, entrepreneurs, business associations and the chambers of commerce, media and journalists and their associations, religious groups as well as between doctors, engineers and teachers and other representatives from different fields,
17. (i) Hoping that Afghanistan continues to be a key partner of the international community in the war against terrorism, (ii). stressing that in order to avoid deterioration of the situation and civil unrest based on the Tokyo Framework, conduct credible, inclusive and trans-parent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015 respectively in accordance with the Afghan Constitution and the required steps in preparation for them, and (iii). emphasizing the need for unification of the positions by all Afghan entities, including the government, the High Peace Council (HPC), the Parliament, legitimate political opposition and civil society in order to provide more robust and independent mandate to the HPC to lead the peace process,
18. (i) Appreciating that according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) some 2.7 million Afghans continue to live in exile in neighboring countries, (ii). Commending the hosting of Afghan refugees by Pakistan and Iran as the situation remains one of the most significant and protracted refugee problems in the world, (iii). Acknowledging that negligible assistance provided to Afghan refugees constitute a great burden on the resources and infrastructure of these two neighboring countries, (iv). Stressing the need for continued international protection and assistance efforts in host countries and for the safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation and sustainable reintegration of the refugees, (v). Calling on the officials of these neighboring countries to focus on skilled labor exchange programs rather than granting refugee status, and (vi). Welcoming research on how the return of these refugees impact the social, economic, political and security developments in Afghanistan,
19. Welcoming previous, current and future alternative initiatives that are sound and practical, including all beneficial mediation and reconciliation efforts by the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries, and beyond,
20. Noting that the myriad of regional processes and initiatives need to be harmonized and fully implemented to ensure the security and territorial integrity of Afghanistan,
21. Determined to devise a lasting way for Afghanistan and the region to live in peace and prosperity, with the realization of Afghanistan’s legitimate interests in the neighboring, near neighboring and regional countries, and beyond, and vice versa,
22. Therefore, wish to assist relevant regional governments and global institutions by making the following recommendations for the success of Afghanistan’s transition in 2014 and the ensuing Decade of Transformation through 2024, hereby submitted in the short, medium and long-term propositions
23. (i). Believe that there is the need to eventually trans-form Afghanistan into an asset for all, itself, the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries and beyond, and (ii). believe further that in order to attain the main objective, there is the immediate need to ensure a smooth political, security and socio-economic transition to a genuinely representative and sovereign Afghan state as well as to the pertinence of finding appropriate mechanisms for non-interference and reconciliation, to formulate and adopt an Afghan National Transition Strategy, Short-term Recommendations (to commence immediately and culminate in 2015):
24. (i). Recognize that the Afghanistan transition urgent-ly requires political participation through an all-inclusive credible national consensus, (ii). identify that this consensus will serve as a catalyst in enabling a prudent and effective leadership able to pursue the collective Afghan interest by overcoming major differences and in being tolerant of alternative views, including the prevailing generational gap, in order to pave the path for transparent, credible, inclusive and timely democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015 respectively, (iii). believe that this Afghan National Transition Strategy must incorporate the views of the state agencies, the legitimate political opposition and the civil society as well as others to agree on a non-partisan, inclusive nation-al action plan wherein the international community’s long-term commitments, their sustained presence and aid flow as outlined in the Tokyo Framework would be availed quid pro quo for Afghanistan achieving rule of law, security, transparency, credible elections, and economic sustainability, and (iv). in this regard, believe further, as is readily and widely accepted, that the media can be force multipliers in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, revival and sustainability as well as disseminators of a positive image for security, development and governance,
25. (i). Realize that simultaneously, on the regional and global fronts, Afghanistan, its neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries must attempt to alleviate security, political and economic concerns surrounding 2014, (ii). believe that a planned transformation of the NATO-led ISAF role and a phased drawdown of their forces into a much smaller non-combat presence to train, advise and assist, while determining its time-specific post-2014 role, presence and support for the expansion, financial and technical assistance for the ANSF, based on the Chicago Summit, ought to ensure that the ANSF is properly trained and equipped to preserve security in the post-2014 phase, (iii). believe further, coupled with this security component, that sustained aid flows for civilian sectors based on the Tokyo Framework and substantial and visible reduction in organized corruption, a legitimate political transition and an increased and effective regional diplomacy will further: (a) enable the ANSF, even in the event of extreme challenges to the state, including the continuation of fighting and possibility of civil war to defend and restore the constitutional order and provide security, (b). prevent a possible return of terrorist and extremist groups like Al Qaeda while facilitating the trans-formation of the armed opposition into political actors and their participation in the democratic process (c) promote development and economic growth, strengthen democratic institutions and consolidate other gains of the past twelve years, and (d) render probable increased Pakistani and region-al roles toward peace and collective interest, and in this context, and (e) encourage all entities in Pakistan to genuinely cooperate in the fight against cross-border threats and to pursue its legitimate regional interests through peaceful means,
26. (i). Call on US and its NATO allies, who intend to have a post-2014 military footprint in Afghanistan that is time-specific, smaller and of non-combat nature, to take a number of CBMs to reassure Afghanistan, its neighbors and other regional countries that their long-term presence in the region is solely to empower the Afghan people and the Afghan Government to man-age their own affairs as an independent nation-state; to combat terrorism, and to train, advise and assist the ANSF; as well as to defend their legitimate interests and to demonstrate that they espouse no other motives, and (ii). call further on them to encourage the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries of Afghanistan to participate in joint anti-terror exercises so that their efforts will bring peace and as a result to share the peace dividends,
27. (i). Stress that in order to overcome competing and, at times, conflicting views and national security interests of the neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries, and global powers, there is the need to complement, streamline and ultimately unify the various bilateral and multilateral forums with capable Afghan coordinating and steering roles, pulling together talent and expertise from the relevant state institutions, the civil society and the legitimate political opposition, (ii). stress further that this will not only generate the needed capacity but will further enhance national ownership, and (iii). emphasize also, while consolidating all interests under the Istanbul and RECCA processes and frameworks – as key current regional architectures – that supplementing them with collaborative tracks I and II efforts, in periodic security and economic convergence, consultations and CBMs will bear faster, more unified, and result-oriented outcomes within the sectors of security, stability and economic cooperation,
28. (i). Emphasize immediately the need to establish a permanent national-level multidisciplinary Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Experts Working Group (preferably inclusive but depending on the circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan, of the Governments, Parliaments, legitimate political opposition groups and the civil society) with a joint secretariat, (ii). recommend that in order to do this, the established group must study past and existing grievances to determine the root causes of the trust deficit between the two countries, (iii). recommend further that the group will assess the root causes in order expedite the process of addressing as well as removing the easiest to the most challenging issues, (iv). propose that as a next step, the group must devise mechanisms for lasting solutions as well as corrective measures to prevent their resurgence in the future, and (v). emphasize that this group must use the above mechanism to overcome historic bottlenecks in order to enhance not only bilateral relations, but also to facilitate development, trade, transit, and prosperity for the wider region,
29. (i). Encourage a resolution of the India-Pakistan differences and tension, (ii). welcome the idea that improved relations between the two would also ameliorate the Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations, which would expand their overlapping legitimate interests in Afghanistan, (iii) suggest that this will contribute to better cooperation between the two on the Afghan stability and reconstruction while avoiding negative fallout due to the incessant India-Pakistan rivalry, and (iv). encourage a stand-alone trilateral dialogue between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan to expedite the above endeavor towards faster accomplishments,
30. (i). Note that the different positions of the Afghan Government, HPC, the Parliament, political opposition and civil society on the peace process should be reconciled, followed by opening a two-track inclusive dialogue with Pakistan and the armed opposition including the Taliban, with the aim of the latter participating in the 2014 and 2015 elections, (ii). observe that, given the nature of the conflict, the process will not succeed, unless jointly initiated and owned by Afghanistan and Pakistan, pursued through legal means and not infringing upon the Afghan Constitution, (iii). recommend that it must involve, in addition to domestic efforts, other regional and international players that can positively assist in the process, and (iv). recommend further, in this respect, a more active role of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Afghanistan or the appointment of a dedicated UN special coordinator as it would assist in facilitating the peace talks,
31. (i). Reiterate the need to smoothen the border crossing of people traveling and goods transiting between Afghanistan and its neighbors in order to expedite rap-id transit of goods and persons, (ii). recommend, in this context, a speedy implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA), including extending it to India at an appropriate time with transit rights for Afghanistan-bound Indian goods and vice versa on the basis of an agreement between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, (iii). recommend further that the agreement will prevent the goods transported between Afghanistan and India via Pakistan from being smuggled into Pakistan as this would disturb its economy, (iv). reiterate further that there is also the need to increase the volume and level of goods mobility as well as access to services between Eurasia, Central Asia and South Asia, and (v). observe that this will require the much needed infrastructure development as well as the necessary capacity building in trade and customs services to link: Central Asia through Afghanistan to South Asia; and, East Asia to Eurasia’s Black Sea Corridor and the Middle East via Afghanistan,
32. (i). Reiterate that in order to overcome the possible economic deficit and the resources and financial gap related to the 2014 transition, a non-partisan, inclusive team of economic and development experts at the national level must be urgently formed, and (ii). reiterate further that the team shall work to produce the outline of the second Afghanistan national development plan (as the term for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy has expired), based on the transition realities and to bring together various disconnected but existing and relevant efforts by the international community in collaboration with the Afghan Government,
33. (i). Urge governments to ensure that private sector companies from their countries, which have won con-tracts in exploring and extracting the natural resources of Afghanistan, remain steadfast in carrying their projects forward successfully, (ii). observe that this, among other advantages, will cultivate a constructive environment for attracting more external investors into Afghanistan, and (iii). recommend strongly that relevant international or regional financial institutions safeguard or compensate the possible losses incurred to companies due to security reasons, Medium-term Recommendations (to commence immediately and culminate in 2018):
34. Stress that in order to enable Afghan ownership, increase economic sustainability as well as build and upgrade state capability to deliver public services effectively and accountably, the international community and the Afghan Government must honor their mutual commitments beyond 2014 and through the Decade of Transformation,
35. Express support for increased regional efforts, including intense diplomatic undertakings (tracks I and II) in addressing each contributing source of regional tension towards the continued implementation of previous declarations of good neighborly relations in line with the critical importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, good governance and development in Afghanistan
36. (i). Encourage regional security and economic organisations and programs, in particular CAREC, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), ECO, SAARC and SCO, and to coordinate the efforts of regional stake-holders for the smooth transition of Afghanistan beyond 2014, and (ii). encourage further, in this respect, for SCO to take a more complementary position in support of the Istanbul and the RECCA processes, especially in counter-narcotics law enforcement,
37. (i). Stress the prioritization of regional endeavors for political, security, economic, social and cultural co-operation in order to effectively realize these priorities, and (ii). stress further that these endeavors will include strategic peace initiatives coupled with the realization of shared and converging economic opportunities as well as other regional commonalities, including improving civil society ties,
38. Emphasize a resolution to Iran-US standoff as it would help improve Afghan-Iranian bilateral relations, allowing the legitimate overlapping interests of the two countries to expand in Afghanistan,
39. Reiterate that until Afghanistan overcomes national and regional threats, and achieves security and stability, it will continue to rely on the training, advice and assistance mission as well as the financial support of the NATO-led ISAF and the international community,
40. (i). Underscore the need to expand and intensify incentives to countries situated on the cross-regional transit corridors, particularly connecting South Asia to Central Asia, by ensuring adequate road and rail net-works combined with better border, and (ii). reiterate, in this context, there is also the need to develop, extend and expand the Afghan railroad system and network, the precedence of which has already been set through Mazar-Hairatan and Herat-Khaf railways, with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Iran,
41. Welcome a trilateral Afghan-Sino-Pak dialogue concerning the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which aims to cover Afghanistan and beyond – not only to improve physical connectivity but also to establish various industries along the corridor,
42. (i). Stress that efforts are needed to make Afghanistan a livable place for its citizens so that Afghans are not forced to leave the country and seek refuge in the Iran, Pakistan and elsewhere, (ii). encourage official discussions on legal migration between Afghanistan and its neighbors, with a focus on skilled labor exchange programs, and (iii). call upon the international com-munity to provide solid and sizeable assistance to relevant government agencies and NGOs involved in the provision of services to these refugees, in particular good education and vocational job-oriented training,
43. Encourage Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors to assist the social and economic development of relevant adjacent provinces and regions of Afghanistan in the form of Special Economic Zones, in close coordination with the central and provincial governments of Afghanistan,
44. (i). Welcome the vision and goal to gradually strive for an Afghan-led and Afghanistan-specific Enduring Neutrality model (for details see the APG paper, »Enduring Neutrality«: Restoring the Traditional Trajectory and Securing a Sovereign and Prosperous Afghanistan), upon having secured the vast support of all major segments of the Afghan population and the region, contingent upon the success of the initiatives and prerequisites stated above, (ii) recommend, where necessary and applicable, this security-bound neutrality framework to draw from the Austrian, Swiss and other existing models, (iii). emphasize that such a status would not only need to be safeguarded by mutually reinforced, cross-cutting regional mechanisms that are practical and durable, but also well-positioned in the world order, (iv). emphasize as such, that it must be respected by its neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries and beyond, and be reciprocated with binding commitments of non-intervention in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and vice versa, (v). emphasize further, it must be guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the international community, with enforcement mechanisms in accordance with the UN Charter, entailing binding ob-ligations as well as retributive measures, (vi) encourage, in the process, that Afghanistan must increasingly improve its internal security capabilities towards the fulfillment of the aspired objective, and in sum, (vii). recognize that Afghanistan must declare its neutrality be codified by neighboring, near-neighboring and regional countries as well as secure parallel or sequential codification by global powers and the UN,
45. (i) Welcome that the mechanisms will seek solid regional commitment and active engagement in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security, stability and prosperity of Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors, with practical measures towards their enforcement, and (ii) welcome further that they would strengthen multi-sectorial cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors, including exploring and expanding joint economic and trade opportunities,
46. Propose, in order to enforce the mechanisms, to: (i) Offer a definition for interference and steps to be taken to refrain from violations, (ii) request from the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy for the overseeing of this mechanism (unless the Istanbul Process takes a regional lead on this; alternatively, for both institutions to pursue oversight jointly) who will also facilitate the regional and international conferences, (iii) request further to receive the endorsement of the mechanism by the Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council at an international conference (iv) seek UN-mandated observers to monitor the breach of conduct, and (v) anticipate that the mechanism will come into operation at the earliest possible and practical time. (Pajhwok)