The Taliban's brutal regime was overthrown in late 2001 with the help of international community led by the United States of America (USA). When Bonn Conference was held following the fall of Taliban, they were viewed as a spent force, with the remnants being chased in the mountains along the borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan. From 2002 to 2006, Afghanistan was trumpeted as a success story of liberalization by Bush Administration.
The force began to resurge in 2006 due, in large part, to continued bankrolling of the militants by elements from contiguous countries, shift of international attention and resources to Iraq war, and President Hamid Karzai's inability to deliver governance and services to Afghans.
Since they were driven out of power, the Taliban have maintained their links with both regional and global terrorist networks. As a result, they have supported and provided recruits for the Taliban as a force of holy warriors that fight, in their view, occupying forces in an Islamic land.
Instead of unifying international community against the Taliban and their regional and trans-regional sponsors, President Karzai adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Taliban and other insurgent groups by coining "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban." There were no signs to be seen in the Taliban to support and provide a proof for such a distinction.
Remaining loyal to one of the three main insurgent groups- the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar and Haqqani Network-, the militants continued to be involved in killing, destroying and disrupting in different parts of the country. President Karzai even furthered his appeasement policy by beginning to call the Taliban as his "upset brothers" and felt it incumbent upon himself, everyone else inside the system, and international community to leave no stone unturned to soothe them.
Such an approach provided a context for the Taliban to continue to strengthen, and to exploit the public grievances rising from rampant corruption and the government's inefficiency to deliver governance and services.
Capitalizing on the "strategic impatience" on the part of international community, some neighboring countries now openly promote the Taliban as a legitimate force to be given a fair share of power. The militants during their rule implemented a kind of medieval obscurantist version of Islam, denied women their right to education and forbade their active social and political presence.
In absence of a broad and grassroots-level women's rights discourse, the scheduled withdrawal of international forces from the country without the reversal of the Taliban's momentum has given rise to growing concern among civil society organizations and human rights groups about the possibility of the Taliban's comeback, and the fear is that they would pursue a revengeful and more repressive policies.
In the meanwhile, the political groupings and alliances that fought the Taliban have begun to worry about president Karzai's policy of bringing the Taliban back to the fold by hook or by crook, strengthening of the Taliban and immature withdrawal of international forces.
Out of sheer fear of being overtaken by the Taliban's possible comeback through compromise or after the withdrawal of international forces, these political groups and alliances are girding themselves to counter and deter president Karzai's continued and unannounced policy of alignment with the Taliban and other insurgent groups as well as remain alert in the face of possible decline of the country into another round of infighting and chaos.
It, therefore, can be rightly claimed that the Taliban that were considered a spent force in the early years of their fall and international presence in Afghanistan are now looming as a specter in terms of threatening both the current political equations and alignments and democratic order and gains made over the last ten years.