Editor in Chief: Moh. Reza Huwaida Friday, March 29th, 2024

What will Afghanistan Lose in the Strategic Deal?

Speaking to fresh graduates of the National Military Academy in Kabul last week, President Karzai promised that all military operations will be carried out by Afghan forces in 2013. The President mentioned the logistic and technical problems that Afghan forces face now, but hoped that the country will be able to find out proper channels to procure and gain them once the army, police and intelligence agencies have acquired human expertise to use them.

When talking about the possible strategic deal with US, which is assumed to determine the country's fate after completion of withdrawal of international troops in 2014, President Karzai, as usual, provided a rambling and ambivalent response. He said that his government is "discussing every single part of the pact carefully, and will sign only if it is for the interest of Afghanistan".

The most important point missing in the President's speech, however, was a clear, consensual and precise definition of Afghanistan's interest. What is really the country's interest? How Afghanistan will practically protect those interests through formal and diplomatic interactions with international community?

Why those core interests are not prominently promoted by Afghan officials and state programs? The painful fact is that a consensual national interest has never been introduced and supported by the government. The major decisions made by the President and his team could be best described as randomly selected, emotionally formulated and poorly presented to Afghan people and international community.

For instance,Afghanistan could launch a war with Pakistan one day, but the next day will take its side if Pakistan was attacked by the United States. As the national interests, there is not a consistent definition of enemy, partnership and our friends. Afghanistan could be a friend or enemy to any country depending on what will happen to it.

The strategic deal with US is adversely suffering from this lingering uncertainty. The government is not sure if it will sign the treaty or if it was able to incorporate those interests in the treaty, but practically realizes that international troops will leave the country soon and the enemy has long been reorganizing and threatening the already vulnerable state to collapse. Meanwhile, it is understandable that despite some narrow political and institutional gains, challenges to state-building remain serious and beyond the government's capacity to independently overcome in immediate future.

There is a genuine common realization in the part of ordinary Afghans that their country needs strategic allies to support it for long-time, and the strategic pact with US is the most realistic and sustainable option that, if honestly conducted, can put a permanent stop on Al-Qaida and the Taliban to re-occupy Afghanistan. If smartly played, Afghanistan does not have much to lose in this game. The most important mission to be achieved is formation of a democratic, peaceful and truly representative nation-state that could be tolerant, sovereign and prosperous at home and actively engaging in international arena.

Almost all independent countries, including Islamic countries, have some sort of partnership with external power to exchange experience and resources to protect and achieve their national goals. There is not any strong logic that Afghanistan should continue to suffer war, militarization, violence and underdevelopment in return for some stereotypes to be maintained.

The current position adopted by Afghan government is not in the interest of strategic deal, nor is it favorable to the ordinary Afghans.

There may not be a single factor for what has contributed to the current stage of uncertainty and tension in Afghanistan's relationship with its principle donors. But,the International community can be equally blamed for inflammation of radical sentiments and polarized views. During more than a decade of expensive engagement, the US-led coalition remains highly isolated from the country's social contexts and sensitivity.

The major bulk of political attention and financial resources were concentrated in specific areas while constituencies with absolute support to government and international community were subjected to intentional negligence and underfunding. The small team controlling power, has skillfully managed to monopolize the official contact points and present their views as a holistic representation of public aspiration and voice.

Afghanistan is composed of several micro-communities with no single ethnic majority that could constitute a clear majority. This in mind, any deal and program will only succeed if it does not satisfy the true and direct consent of all important formal and informal actors.