Article/Opinion

By Ghulam Raza
After more than two decades of war and instability, Afghanistan has embarked on an ambitious program of national reconciliation and reconstruction. The Bonn Conference of December 2001 brought together members of the international community committed to Afghanistan's transition to peace and prosperity and laid the foundations for the country's political, economic, and social transformation. What has been achieved so far? Years after Bonn agreement, there seems to be considerable ground for optimism about Afghanistan's future.
An independent government has been established, with the support of the international donor community, the government has made tremendous efforts in the areas of education, health, and agriculture. Agricultural production has relatively decreased compared last years. The government has undertaken a tremendous effort to eradicate poppy cultivation. The numbers of students and teachers returning to school as a result of International assistance more then Afghan students enrolled and another in schooling. Education was one of the success stories of the first year of reconstruction, particularly in reopening schools to girls after they were banned from the classroom during the Taliban's five-year rule. Yet significant challenges remain and one cannot be overly optimistic. Eighty percent of the Afghan populations live in the rural areas, and so far little has been done to improve their situation. Lack of professional capacity in many areas is enormous but very little has been done to build local capacity.
Higher and professional education is not given much priority. Afghanistan's five universities are struggling to cope with high demand, a majority of youths are hopeful for some limited job opportunities. While agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in the country, neither the government nor the international organizations have done much in that area. Given that most people in Afghanistan are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, environmental concerns cannot be overlooked if Afghanistan is to revive its once thriving farming sector and move away from its dependency on food aid. Many achievements are limited to Kabul and surrounding areas, and little progress has been made in other parts of the country. Much of the population continues to suffer from poverty and violence. Less than 25 percent of the population has access to safe water, and an even smaller number of people have access to basic sanitation and electricity.
The country's basic infrastructure is also in terrible need of improvement. Although the social status of Afghan women has significantly improved, yet again women and girls are still being abused, harassed, and threatened all over Afghanistan and still women are not allowed for education institutes. Which has produced a shortage of female teachers, the restrictions will result in a severe limitation on the ability of women and girls to receive proper education. Many non-governmental organizations have been set up inside Afghanistan, but they are facing serious problems in becoming effective and fully operational due to acute lack of qualified staff and financial resources and lack of access to knowledge and opportunities.
While the situation with food security has greatly improved over last year which prevented Afghan people from starvation during this winter, the ongoing challenge of providing food for so many people, primarily refugees, is enormous. Another unresolved issue is donor coordination and assuring aid effectiveness and transparency. Special efforts need to be made to prevent this potential problem or at least mitigate it.
Children and youth continue to be among the most vulnerable groups of the Afghan society and deserve a targeted support from the international community to realize their full potential and bring the country to prosperity. Transportation infrastructure has been severely damaged and much needs to be done to repair it and build new roads and airports. The security situation still remains a major concern for the reconstruction community, especially in the provinces, and a possible war in Iraq may seriously aggravate it. According to the latest Care International Report, Afghanistan's security vacuum will not resolve itself, and urgent international attention is needed. Specifically, the report recommends increased support for army and police training programs and the establishment of an international security force in key locations outside of Kabul. The Central government and people in the country must remain committed to significant and lasting change in the country. With support from the international community and through patient and persistent efforts, Afghanistan can ensure a sustainable victory over its political, economic, and social challenges. The statistics signal that well-armed groups and its associate militants holed up in caves, tribal villages and craggy peaks will remain a threat to the government for years and for the on going construction and peace process in the country.
This year has been the deadliest for US troops in Afghanistan since war began in late 2001, as more American soldiers have died. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) have used those terrorist tactics, including beheadings, summary executions of people accused as spies, abductions and death threats as well as a skillful propaganda campaign to make the insurgency seem more powerful and omnipresent than it really is, and the perception matters here. The increasing use of very public attacks has had a striking effect on morale far beyond the immediate victims. Some of that brutality may be attributed to the growing influence AOGs associates, but much of it has by now taken root within the insurgents' ranks. After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, members of terrorist networks and the AOGs sought refuge in neighbor’s country lawlessness areas, which have since become a breeding ground where the AGEs and its associate and foreign fighters have found common cause against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and have shared terrorist tactics and insurgent strategies.
The success of peace-building activities in Afghanistan, a nation physically and psychologically scarred by 23 years of internecine conflict, is dependent on the existence of a robust and durable commitment by the international community. The ineffectiveness of security sector reform has been compounded by the lack of progress in the sphere of economic development. Frustration over the slow pace of reconstruction is palpable across the country. If the government or the international community does not deliver on its promises to the populace, it is likely to lose its support.
(Ghulam Raza is Permanent Writer of Daily Outlook Afghanistan and writes on national and international issues. He can be reached through Mail@outlookafghanistan.com)

By: Author: Eng. Ajmal Shams
Political parties in Afghanistan have been in constant flux since overthrow of the Taliban Regime in late 2001 and adoption of the new constitution. The history of political parties in the war-torn country goes back to the period of King Zahir Shah’s monarchy when the 1964 constitution legalized the formation of political and social organizations. This freedom soon resulted into three major political movements which can be broadly classified as Islamist, Marxist and Nationalist. Abdul Raheem Niazai created the Islamic group called Jawanan-e-Musulman (The Muslim Youth) in 1969, which took inspiration from the Ekhwan-ul-Muslimeen (The Muslim Brotherhood) founded by Hasanul Bana in Egypt. It is noteworthy that most of the Afghan Mujahideen Leaders were associated with the aforementioned movement including those currently influential in the Afghan government. Marxists formed People’s Democratic Party under Noor Muhammad Taraki and looked towards the Soviet Communist Party as their guiding force. The nationalist movement which rejected all kinds of foreign ideologies appeared in the form of Wekh Zalmyan (Awakened Youth), and Afghan Mellat Party founded by Eng. Ghulam Mohammad Farhad, the Kabul mayor and a respected parliamentarian.
Each movement or party had its peculiar manifesto and a vision for Afghanistan and each saw its ideology as the only panacea for all political and socio-economic problems of the country. The Islamists believed that only a radical Islamic government was the solution of all problems. They asserted that being Muslims, Afghans had no other option but to jointly struggle for the establishment of a truly Islamic government where all affairs of the state would be strictly dealt with as per their own narrow interpretation of Islam. The Marxists viewed problems of the country as a class struggle, where the so-called upper class exploited the working class. While the reality was that no such class existed in country at the time. They believed that unless the authority of the upper class had been abolished, true social justice could not be established. On the other hand Afghan Mellat Party advocated the cause of Afghan Nationalism based on social democratic principles to lead the country towards real development and progress. However, it was able to attract mainly the Pashtuns and its message did not get much appeal among the ethnic minorities, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras due to its stance regarding Pashto language and Patkhtunistan.
All the three major political movements were able to attract a large number of Afghans towards their respective ideologies. Schools, colleges and universities became hubs of political activities and student unions were formed in several universities. Besides these major political parties, there also emerged minor groups like Shola-e-Jawid (The Eternal Flame), which had Maoist orientations and a small nationalist party called Mellat Party, an offspring of Afghan Mellat. Another significant development was the splitting up in 1967 of People’s Democratic Party into its Khalq and Parcham factions each one led by PDPA founder Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal respectively. Most members of Khalq belonged to rural Pashtun areas. On the other hand, Parcham was mainly composed of urban middle class Tajiks. Afghan Mellat, due to its peculiar nationalist agenda attracted diverse sections of Afghan society. However, a majority of its membership was concentrated among Pashtuns.
In 1973, Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, the former prime minister and a firm nationalist, overthrew his cousin King Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup. Daud tried to systematically eliminate the Communists, who were instrumental in his coming to power, but it was too late since the latter had already entrenched themselves very well in the civil and military bureaucracy. Daud was eventually overthrown by the communists in a bloody coup, killing him and all members of his family thus ending Mohammadzai Dynasty in Afghanistan. Noor Mohammad Taraki became head of the revolutionary council and President of the Communist Regime, starting an era of public uprising, instability, bloodshed and misfortune that was to last for decades and whose legacy continues till this day. The Islamist insurgents who had already been active to destabilize Daud’s government became even more prominent with the Communists’ rise to power and more so with the Soviet occupation of the country.
The Afghan resistance against foreign invasion was broadly classified into two main categories divided along ideological lines i.e. The Bunyadgara (Islamic radicals) and Milligara (The Islamic nationalists or moderate Islamists). While there were more than twenty political parties and groups, only seven were recognized in Pakistan and the West and they alone were qualified to receive all kinds of military, financial and political support. The Bunyadgara included Hezb-e-Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. A party with a similar name was led by Maulawi Mohammad Younas Khalis, but was less prominent than the former.
However, it was this party which contributed most members to the Taliban movement. Other parties in the first category included Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society Party) led by Ustad Rabbani and Ittehad-e-Islami (Islamic Unity Party) led by Ustad Sayyaf and Jamiat-e-Dawa-e-Islami led by Mawlavi Hussain, who, later on, changed his name to Jamil-ur-Rahman based on his adherence to Wahhabism. Ustad Sayyaf was another case of name change from Abdurrasul Sayyaf to Aburrab Rasul Sayyaf.
The Miligara included Mahaz-e-Mille-wa-Islami (The National Islamic Front) led by Pir Syed Ahmed Gelani and Jabha-e-Nijat Milli (National Salvation Front) led by Hazrat Sebghatullah Mujaddedi. The Harakat-e-Inqilabi Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement Party) led by Mawlawai Mohammad Nabi did not include the word Milli implying nationalist in its name but was more moderate and did not seem to pursue any radical agenda.
Besides the above seven recognized parties, there were also other parties and pressure groups. The most significant among them was Afghan Social Democratic Party well known as Afghan Mellat Party. Its founder President Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad was in Kabul and the party was led in exile by Shamsul Huda Shams, who was eventually elected to lead the party after the demise of Eng. Ghulam Mohammad Farhad in 1984. Afghan Mellat was the main victim of the Islamic radical groups because of its nationalistic and social democratic agenda which was deemed to be Un-Islamic. The seven recognized parties, though so diverse in their ideology and approach, were one-voice in their opposition to the nationalist Afghan Mellat. Being nationalist was equated with being secular and un-Islamic in spite of the party leadership’s argument that Afghan nationalism had Islam as an integral component and there was no need to carry it as a banner. Only Mahaz and Jabha-e-Nejat-e Milli had somewhat of a soft corner towards Afghan Mellat.
The fact remains, however, that not all parties who had became prominent during the period of resistance against the Soviet occupation had a well-defined political ideology except Hezb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar, Jamiat-e-Islami of Rabbani, Ittehad-e-Isalmi of Ustad Sayyaf and Afghan Mellat of Shamsul Huda Shams. The rest acted more or less as facilitating partners of donor governments for distributing aid, and organizing military warfare against the incumbent Communist Regime of the time with little to offer to Afghans in terms of an alternate political system once the communist regime would be defeated.
(To be Continued)
(Continued From Yesterday)
Inside Afghanistan, rapid political changes came one after another. Noor Mohammad Taraki was replaced by hardliner Hafizullah Amin in a coup that caused the former’s assassination. Amin believed more in home-grown communism and did not agree with the Soviet intervention in his country. The Soviet Regime soon realized Amin’s potential anti-Soviet motives. His regime was overthrown by a full-fledged military intervention killing him and installing the Parchami Regime under their more loyal Babrak Karmal with whom they felt more at ease.
When the Geneva Accords under which the Soviet troops were to leave the country were signed, Mujahideen were not a signatory to it, although they were one of the two main parties to the conflict. The top commanders from various Mujahideen parties had established direct links with their respective supporting governments. A significant amount of military and financial aid, which in principle should have been channelized through the central command of Mujahideen parties, was instead delivered directly to the commanders.
Even after the Soviets had left Afghanistan, they kept supporting Dr. Najibullah’s Regime and hostilities continued. After resisting for a few year Najibullah’s regime was eventually overthrown in April 1992 through a military coup by an alliance of his own commanders in collusion with some Mujahideen parties, the most prominent being Jamiat-e-Islami and its well-known commander Ahmed Shah Masood. It is noteworthy that overthrowing Dr. Najibullah through a military coup was a well-planned conspiracy aimed at sabotaging the United Nations peace formula under which power could have been peacefully transferred to a 15-member council under the auspices of the United Nations. While Mujaddeddi was the so-called head of the new Islamic regime, the political atmosphere in the country had virtually degenerated into a state of complete anarchy. Every region of the country was controlled by a certain warlord or group. Fighting continued among various Mujahideen parties, groups and commanders to get more control. At this point the West had almost lost its interest in Afghanistan while Iran, Pakistan and central Asia together with Russia had become more involved in the affairs of Afghanistan.
Against this backdrop of chaos, lawlessness, complete anarchy and internecine fightings the Taliban mysteriously emerged on the scene as religious reformers in 1994. They claimed that the Mujahideen had been corrupted and did not deliver on their promises of establishing a truly Islamic government based on Sharia (Islamic Law) in the country. In an astonishingly short span of time, the religious students were able to extend their writ to large parts of the country eventually taking control of the capital Kabul in 1996. The Taliban had their own ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam and they actually enforced a strict Sharia in the areas under their control. Women were banned from going to school or work. Men were required to grow beards. Music, photography and even some sports were banned. The way the Taliban pursued their governance did not fit into the norms of the civilized world. The Taliban phenomena, however, cannot be simplified to be attributed to a single factor. Together with an indigenous situation that was favorable for their creation, there were a host of political, economic and ideological factors that paved the way for their emergence and their subsequent victories. While the international community did not recognize the Taliban regime and had imposed sanctions against them, it was their resolve to shelter Osama Bin Laden and the catastrophic events of the September 11 that caused their downfall.
After the Taliban were overthrown in November 2001, Hamid Karzai was appointed as the interim president of the country under the Bonn Agreement. Subsequently he won the presidential election in 2004, becoming the first democratically elected president of the country. The new constitution also allowed the formation of political parties and social organizations that shall abide by and work within the framework of the constitution. The parties are also required to be officially recognized by Ministry of Justice in order to benefit from their rights and privileges. A new wave of democracy and freedom at the horizons of the country has caused a party boom. So far nearly hundred parties have been recognized and more will keep adding to the list, albeit with little success to attract people especially those that have newly been founded. In particular, the old Jehadi and communist parties have little prospects of maintaining their influence since both have been tested in the past and neither has managed to deliver on their promises.
The role of political parties is crucial to strengthening democracy in the country. Although party registration per se is a positive measure aimed at systematizing the formation and activities of the political parties, the manner in which it is being implemented raises concerns that the government by making the parties register with a ministry might be trying to control them which is undemocratic in essence. It is being argued that the parties should instead be overseen by an independent election commission.
While the number of political parties has been growing tremendously, their active role in the country’s political scene is hardly noticeable. The newly-democratizing Afghanistan is in dire need of a robust political culture, which can only be realized through well established and strong political parties that can present a broad message of hope, stability and unity.
The writer is President of the Afghanistan Social Democratic Party (well knows as Afghan Mellat Party)