Defining Diplomacy Down

By: Mohammad Zahir Akbari

Ge nerally, the parliamentary elections is a great milestone for the Afghans. It ensures the democratic legitimacy as the base of the next government, besides assessing the election cost and pros from different views of the people. Both the Afghan and international observers lured for the smoothness of the election. The apportioning aspects of the elections, which appreciated by the Afghans, are: the participation of people, active awareness of media and the sanctity of security forces. The govt. of the country is likely to face some negligence if the security forces are not cleared. On the other hand, there were also some negative issues such as infant mortality, diseases and social and technical mismanagement.

Regarding participation of people and resistance of security forces, all the national and international stakeholders’ approved achievements of the people in the elections. The Election Commission of Afghanistan (ECA) said in a statement released on October 20 that it was “encouraged by the high numbers” of Afghans who braved security threats and waited long hours to cast their votes. UNAMA described it as “the first completely free and fair election”.

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